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Outsourcing and Technological Change
* 
 
We present a dynamic model where the probability of outsourcing production is increasing in 
the firm’s expectation of technological change. As the pace of innovations in production 
technologies increases, the less time the firm has to amortize the sunk costs associated with 
purchasing and adopting new technologies to produce in-house. Therefore, purchasing from 
market suppliers, who can afford to use the latest technology, becomes relatively cheaper. 
The predictions of the model are tested using a panel dataset on Spanish firms for the time 
period 1990 through 2002. In order to address potential endogeneity problems, we use an 
exogenous proxy for technological change, namely the number of patents granted by the 
U.S. patent office classified by technological class. We map the technological classes to the 
Spanish industrial sectors in which the patents are used and provide causal evidence of the 
impact of expected technological change on the likelihood and extent of production 
outsourcing. No prior study has been able to provide such causal evidence. Our results are 
robust to the inclusion of detailed characteristics of the firms as well as firm fixed effects. 
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   Outsourcing, or the contracting out of activities to subcontractors outside the firm, has 
become widespread in many countries.
1  A number of explanations for the increase in outsourcing 
have been proposed and tested in the literature. Among them are that outsourcing is a response to 
unpredictable variations in demand (Abraham and Taylor, 1996),  an opportunity to take 
advantage of the  specialized knowledge of suppliers (Abraham and Taylor, 1996), and a method 
to save on labor costs (Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Autor, 2001; Diaz-Mora, 2005; and Girma and 
Gorg, 2004).
2   
  Another important determinant of outsourcing is technology and this has been the subject 
of theoretical and empirical work. According to the transactions costs theory (Williamson 1975, 
1985), if investments result in greater asset specificity, firms fearing expropriation of investments 
will reduce outsourcing. The property rights theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986) predicts that 
vertical integration between an upstream firm (the supplier) and a downstream firm (the final 
good producer) generates different costs and benefits to each of the parties.  Therefore, the 
incentives to integrate or to outsource depend on which investments – the supplier’s or the final 
good producer’s – are relatively more important for the success of the joint relationship 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Gibbons, 2005; Hubbard, 2008).
3    
  Some empirical studies have focused on testing these theories.  In a study of U.K. 
manufacturing firms, Acemoglu et.al. (2010) found evidence consistent with the predictions of 
                                                 
1 See Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001), Girma and Gorg (2004), Mol (2005), Magnani (2006) and 
Abramovsky and Griffith (2006). 
 
2 Other researchers (Ono (2007) and Holl (2008)) have studied the effect of agglomeration economies on 
outsourcing. For empirical studies of the impacts of outsourcing on wages and productivity, see Feenstra 
and Hanson (1999), Amiti and Wei (2006), Gorg, Hanley and Strobl (2007),   Gorg and Hanley (2007), and 
Lopez (2002).  
 
3 Grossman and Helpman (2003, 2005) and Antras (2005a, 2005b) use the insights of the property rights 
theory to study important issues in international trade such as the decision to obtain intermediate inputs by 
engaging in foreign direct investment or contracting with arm’s-length overseas suppliers.  
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the property rights theory, namely that technology intensity in the producing industry is 
associated with more vertical integration while technology intensity in the supplying industry is 
associated with less integration, where technology intensity is measured by R&D intensity.  
Lileeva and Van Biesebroeck (2008) also found evidence consistent with the predictions of the 
property rights model, using data on Canadian manufacturing firms. Mol (2005), however, found 
that in the Dutch manufacturing sector, R&D-intensive industries were able to solve the non-
contractibility problem by using partnership relations with outside suppliers to reduce the 
likelihood of specific investments being appropriated.
4 Other studies that have examined the 
relationship between technology and outsourcing, without relying on the transactions cost or 
property rights theories,  are Magnani (2006) who found evidence that technological diffusion 
driven by R&D spillovers was in part responsible for the growth of outsourced services in the 
U.S. and Abramovsky and Griffith (2006) who found that UK firms that were intensive in 
information and communication technologies were more likely to purchase services in the 
market. 
In this paper we provide an alternative perspective on the relationship between 
technology and outsourcing.  Unlike previous studies which have focused on the nature or 
intensity of technology, we focus on expectations of technology change. We present a dynamic 
model that analyzes how firms’ expectations with regards to technological change influence the 
decision to outsource production, an issue ignored in the literature.
5  Our model abstracts from 
other considerations such as transactions costs or asset specificity. The model shows that 
outsourcing becomes more beneficial to the firm when technology is changing rapidly.  A firm 
                                                 
4 Baker and Hubbard (2003) consider how information technology in the trucking industry impacts 
contracting possibilities and vertical integration. Baccara (2007)  uses a general equilibrium model to study 
how information leakages could affect a firm’s outsourcing decision as well as its investments in R&D.   
 
5 Lewis and Sappington (1991) present a model in which technological progress acts to reduce the cost 
asymmetries between suppliers and end users. In their model, technological progress reduces the suppliers’ 
cost advantage, thereby making outsourcing less likely. Unlike Lewis and Sappington, our model does not 
consider the nature of technology but focuses instead on the rate of change of  the technology.   
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can buy the latest technology and produce intermediate inputs in-house. Firms incur a sunk cost 
when adopting new technologies.  Outsourcing, on the other hand, enables the firm to purchase 
inputs from supplying firms using the latest production technology while avoiding the sunk costs 
of the new technology.  As the pace of innovations in production technology increases, the less 
time the firm has to amortize the sunk costs associated with purchasing the new technologies. 
This makes producing in-house with the latest technologies relatively more expensive than 
outsourcing. The model therefore provides an explanation for the recent increases in outsourcing 
that have taken place in an environment of increased expectations for technological change. 
We test the predictions of the model using a panel dataset of Spanish firms for the time 
period 1990 through 2002. This dataset is superior to those used in previous studies of the 
determinants of outsourcing in several dimensions.
6  First, unlike many studies that used industry 
level data, we use a large sample of firms. Second, we have panel data that allow us to observe 
changes within firms over a long time period. Third, in addition to detailed information on 
outsourcing, the dataset provides rich information related to technological activities, such as the 
use of computers, investment in R&D, registration of patents, and product innovation. 
While information on the firm’s technological activities is likely to be correlated with the 
firm’s expectations of technological change, these variables cannot be treated as purely 
exogenous. To address this endogeneity problem, we use the number of patents granted by the 
U.S. patent office classified by technological class and map the technological classes to the 
Spanish industries in which the patents are used.
7  The empirical results support the main 
prediction of the theoretical model, namely, that all other things equal, outsourcing increases with 
the probability of technological change.  Our use of the patent variable enables us to conclude 
that this relationship is causal; no prior study has been able to provide causal evidence of the 
                                                 
6 Holl (2008) used this dataset to study the effect of agglomeration economies on outsourcing and Lopez 
(2002) used it to study the impact of outsourcing on wages. 
7 Patents are commonly classified by the industry in which they originated, while our analysis calls for a 
classification by industry of use.  In Section III we describe how we constructed such a measure.  
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impact of technological change on outsourcing. We also show that our results are robust to the 
inclusion of a measure of relationship-specific investments and furthermore that the patents 
variable remains significant when the analysis is restricted to industries with little relationship-
specific investments. Importantly, this shows that our results cannot be explained by the 
transactions cost or property rights theories. Finally, our finding regarding the relationship 
between patents and outsourcing is robust to the inclusion of firm-level fixed effects, unlike the 
findings for many of the non-technology variables that prior researchers have studied.  
 Part II describes a simple dynamic model of the relationship between outsourcing and 
expected technological change. The complete model is given in the Appendix.  Part III discusses 
the data and empirical specifications used to test the predictions of the model. Results are 
presented in Part IV. Part V concludes. 
 
II.  The Decision to Outsource Production 
  In this section we present a simple model that shows how the decision to outsource 
production is related to the probability of technological change. The complete model is presented 
in the Appendix. The model is motivated with the following example. 
  Suppose that the production of a final good requires an input that is composed of 
advanced capital equipment and labor.  This input can either be produced in-house by the final 
good firm or it can be purchased in the market from an external supplier. The latter option 
amounts to outsourcing the production process. Installing the capital equipment and training the 
workforce to use the equipment involve expenses that are sunk to the firm.  Suppose that 
technological change occurs in the sector supplying capital goods to this firm. For example, new 
IT-enhanced capital equipment becomes available for use in manufacturing.
8 The firm will need 
                                                 
8 For example, in many manufacturing industries, computer numerically controlled (CNC) machines 
replaced numerically controlled machines which had previously replaced manual machines. See Bartel, 
Ichniowski and Shaw (2007) for a discussion of the impact of these new technologies on productivity in the 
valve-making industry.  
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to decide between making this capital investment  or outsourcing the production of the final good 
to a firm that uses the new equipment. The relative costs of in-house production will increase if 
the frequency of technological change is increasing because the length of time over which a given 
fixed investment will benefit the firm becomes too short to justify incurring the sunk costs 
associated with the investment, making outsourcing the cheaper alternative.
9 The model we 
present below captures the essence of this example. 
A firm produces a profit-maximizing amount q of a final good using a single input  . x  
The model focuses on determining how to procure a given level of input  . x  There are two ways 
of obtaining  . x  One way is to produce x in-house, while the other way is to buy x in the 
market, which we refer to as "outsourcing production" . We implicitly assume that there are firms 
(the suppliers) willing to produce and supply x, i.e., there is an active market for x but we do 
not model the supply side here. The final good producer takes the price of x as given. 
For simplicity we assume constant returns to scale in production. This allows us, after a 
normalization, to set  = x q  which is desirable for the empirical work since q is observed. This 
assumption also ensures that the firm does not split x between in-house production and 
outsourcing. The firm will either produce all of x in-house or will outsource all of it.
10 Let 
=1 t y  indicate that the firm decides to outsource x in period  , t  while  =0 t y  indicates in-house 
production of x. 
                                                 
9 The firm could also attempt to lower its sunk costs by outsourcing the training of its workforce.  For 
example, the firm may need to hire an instructor to train a single operator of the advanced equipment, but 
the same instructor could probably train more than one person simultaneously without incurring additional 
costs. The combination of a sunk cost and indivisibility (of the instructor) is precisely the feature being 
exploited by temporary employment agencies (Autor, 2001): they use the same instructor to train several 
workers in basic computer skills and offer them to firms at an attractive price because they can spread the 
sunk cost over a larger output (computer-skilled workers). Our model and empirical work does not consider 
outsourcing of training but rather focuses on the outsourcing of production. 
10In reality, however, firms usually outsource part of their production, so that we should interpret x as one 
of the multiple input components of the final output.  
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In order to produce x in-house the firm uses another input which we call  “machines" , 
each of which produces  t θ  units of  . x  The productivity parameter θ  evolves over time in a 



















 where  >0 . δ  
Our goal is to show how the decision to outsource depends on  , λ  the probability of 
technological change. Note that technological change occurs in the sector producing the machines 
used in the production of  . x  Thus, we view technological change as embodied in machines. 
The revenues obtained from selling the final good do not depend on the way in which x 
was procured. Thus, the decision to produce x in-house or to buy it in the market (outsource it ) 
depends on which alternative is cheaper. At the beginning of each period, the state of technology 
is realized and the firm compares the costs of in-house production (
0) C  to the costs of 
outsourcing 
1 () C . 
Adopting a new technology involves the payment of  0 ≥ s  dollars to use it. The sunk 
cost s  is associated with installing and using the machines of a given productivity for the first 
time. s  is incurred only once and includes training costs. For simplicity, this sunk cost does not 
depend on the firm's previous experience with in-house production. Thus, there are no dynamic 
gains associated with in-house production. 
When a new technology appears in the market a firm that decides to produce in-house 
can, in principle, always " skip" the new, upgraded machines. That is, the firm has the option to 
continue using the previous (old) technology if it has bought it in the past, or it could even buy  
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the old technology in the market if it did not do so previously. It is not always profitable to adopt 
the latest technology. This adoption decision depends on whether using the upgraded technology 
is less costly than using the old technology. This is determined by the size of the sunk cost 
relative to the savings of using the latest technology. However, to simplify the analysis and 
because this adoption decision is not the focus of the paper, we will assume that upgrading 
always dominates keeping the old technology (and, as shown in the Appendix, we make the 
necessary assumptions that guarantee this is the optimal decision). Thus, if a firm decides to 
produce in-house it will always do so using the latest technology. 
The cost of in-house production 
0 C  is therefore the cost of production using the latest 
technology available. A-fortiori, this assumption logically implies that suppliers of x in the 
market should always be producing with the latest technology because they spread the sunk cost 
of upgrading over a larger quantity of output. Thus, outsourcing involves buying x from 
suppliers using the latest technology. 
The cost of in-house production 
0 C  depends on whether technology changed from last 
period and on the firm’s outsourcing decision last period,  1. − t y  If technology changed, the firm 
will pay the sunk cost s  and other costs of production to produce q units of  . x  If there was no 
change in technology the firm does not need to pay s  again if it already produced in-house last 
period  1 (= 0 ) − t y  but, if it did outsource last period  1 (= 1 ) , − t y  it will have to pay s  to produce 
in-house with the latest technology (the one existing last period). Thus, 
0
11 (, , , ,) . −− tt t C y sq θθ  
The cost of outsourcing 
1 C  depends on the market price of x which can vary with 
technology but it does not depend on  1. − t y  The price of x, as well as the prices of the machines,  
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may depend on the state of technology θ, as shown in the Appendix, but to simplify the notation 
here we do not condition on prices explicitly. Thus, 
1
1 (, ,) . − tt Cq θθ
11 
At the beginning of each period  , t  the firm observes the evolution of technology up to  , t  
i.e.,  12 (, , ,) −− K tt t θ θθ  and its past actions ( 12 , ,) , −− K tt yy  as well as the sunk cost s  and the level 
of output q it wants to produce. The firm makes its (discrete) outsourcing decision in order to 
maximize the expected discounted value of its profits. Note that the Markovian nature of 
technology implies that only  t θ  affects the future evolution of technology. However, because the 
costs of procuring x depend on whether  t θ  is a new technology and on whether it was previously 
used or not  1 () − t y , the firm bases its outsourcing decision at t also on  1 − t θ  and  1. − t y  
Let  11 (, , , ,) −− tt t Vy s q θ θ  be the expected discounted value of the firm's stream of profits 




11 11 11 ( ,,, , ) = ( ,,, , ) , ( ,,, , ) −− −− −− tt t tt t tt t V ys qM a x V ys q V ys q θθ θθ θθ  (1) 
 
 where 
0 V  is the expected discounted value if the firm decides to produce in-house 
during  , t  i.e.,  =0 , t y  and 
1 V  is defined similarly when the firm decides to outsource, i.e., 
=1. t y  




11 11 = 1 (, , , ,) (, , , ,)0 −− −− ⇔−≥ tt t t t t t y V ys qV ys q θθ θθ  (2) 
                                                 
11 In the formal model we also add other factors that affect the cost of outsourcing that are known to the 
firm but unobserved to the econometrician. These factors reflect adjustment costs due to loss of control 
over the input design, i.e., the additional cost of using a standardized input. This additional cost is absent 
when x is produced in-house because the firm can perfectly tailor the input to its specific needs.  
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In the Appendix we solve for 
10 − VV  which completely determines the firm's 
outsourcing decision in period t as a function of ( ) 11 ,,, , . −− tt t ys q θθ  This implies that there is a 
threshold value for the sunk cost s  such that firms with s  below the threshold produce in-house 
while those with sunk costs above the threshold  outsource in period  . t  
This threshold value depends on the state variables as well as on the parameters of the 
model. We are interested in how the threshold value changes with  . λ  In the Appendix we show 
that the threshold value decreases with λ  (for any value of the state) and therefore firms facing 
higher expectations of technological change in their inputs -- a higher λ  -- are more likely to 
outsource, all other things equal.
12 Thus, when λ  increases and new production technologies are 
more likely to appear in the future, firms will be more reluctant to buy the current machines today 
and produce in-house because these technologies will soon be obsolete. Upgrading the 
technology -- which is the optimal thing to do -- involves incurring a sunk cost di novo. The 
higher is  , λ  the more frequently the new machines arrive and the less time the firm has to 
amortize the sunk costs. Instead, the firm can use outsourcing to obtain x from supplying firms 
using the latest technology and avoid the sunk costs. All other things equal, an increase in λ  
decreases the cost of outsourcing relative to that of in-house production making the firm more 
likely to outsource. This is the main prediction of the model that we take to the data. 
  
III. Data and Empirical Specification 
  We use data for 1990-2002 from the Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE, or 
Survey on Business Strategies), a survey of 3,195 Spanish manufacturing firms conducted by the 
Fundacion SEPI with the support of the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade. The survey has 
                                                 
12In addition, larger firms and firms facing higher adjustment costs from outsourcing also have higher 
probabilities of producing in-house.  
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been conducted annually since 1990 and is an unbalanced panel. In 1990, all firms with more than 
200 employees were asked to participate in the survey (with a response rate of 70 percent). Firms 
with 10-200 employees were chosen according to a random sampling scheme. In subsequent 
years, as firms dropped from the survey, new firms were incorporated into the sample using the 
same sampling criteria as in the base year. There are approximately 1800 firms in each year of the 
survey.  
The survey includes annual information on firms’ production outsourcing decisions,  
defined as a contractual relationship in which the firm commissions a third party to produce 
products, parts, or components made to the firm’s specifications.
13 We use this information to 
create two indicators of production outsourcing: a dummy for whether or not the firm engaged in 
outsourcing, and the value of outsourcing divided by total costs. Total costs are defined as the 
sum of: (1) labor costs, (2) the cost of external services (R&D, advertising, public relations and 
other) and (3) purchases of goods for sale in the same condition in which they were acquired, raw 
materials and other consumables, and work carried out by subcontractors. The items in (3) are 
reported in the survey as an aggregate figure.  
Table 1 shows the percentage of firms that reported outsourcing at least some part of 
production during the 1990 – 2002 time period and the mean value of the outsourced production 
as a percentage of total cost.  On average, 43% of firms reported that they outsourced production 
during this time period. The outsourcing percentage rose from 35% in 1990 to 42% in 2002, with 
even higher values in some of the intervening years.  There is significant variation in the 
likelihood of outsourcing across industries ranging from a low of 7.7% for “man-made fibers” to 
a high of 77.5% for “agricultural and forestry machinery”. The average value of the outsourced 
production as a percentage of total costs is 5.4 percent during this time period; for firms that did 
outsource production, the mean value of outsourced production as a percentage of total costs is 13 
                                                 
13 Production outsourcing does not include purchases of non-customized products, parts or components.   
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percent, with a low of 1.8 percent (industrial process control equipment) and a high of 23.7 
percent (agricultural and forestry machinery). 
  The model in the Appendix derives the decision to outsource, yit , as a function of  
expected technological change, λ, size of the firm (output or sales), lagged outsourcing and input 
prices. Under the assumption that input prices are common to all firms in an industry, these will 
be captured by industry dummies (ID).  The main implication of the model presented in Part II is 
that, all other things equal, the probability of outsourcing increases with the exogenous 
probability of technological change, λ, which is given to the firm and represents the probability of 
technological change in the production process. The model also predicts that the probability of 
outsourcing decreases with sales, qt. 
As a first approximation to the model, we estimate equation (3): 
=+ + + ∑ it it it j ij it
j
yq I D u βλ α δ     (3) 
where the dependent variable is either of the two measures of outsourcing.  Later, we add 
dynamics to this equation. 
In order to test the main prediction of the model, we need a proxy for λ, the firm’s 
expectations with regard to technological change in its production process.  The Spanish dataset 
includes a number of variables which might be reasonable proxies for λ. The firm’s investment in 
R&D or its patent registrations can be good proxies to the extent that R&D (or patenting) is used 
to adapt exogenous changes in the production technology to the specific requirements of the firm.  
The notion of R&D serving this adaptive role has been tested by Cohen and Leventhal (1989). 
Another suitable proxy could be whether the firm engages in  product innovation since this may  
be facilitated by exogenous changes in production technologies. Summary statistics for R&D  
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intensity, patent registrations, and product innovation are shown in Appendix Table A-1.  While 
these variables are likely to be correlated with the firms’ expectations of technological change in 
its production process, they could be endogenous if unobserved factors drive these decisions as 
well as the decision to outsource. For example, firms that are unobservably more “innovative” or 
“creative” may be engaging in more R&D, registering patents, engaging in product innovations 
and outsourcing production.    
We can partially address this concern by exploiting the panel nature of our data which 
allows us to control for time-invariant unobserved factors that affect both the decision to engage 
in R&D (and therefore increase λ) and to outsource.  Inclusion of fixed effects also enables us to 
control for other factors that affect the cost of outsourcing such as adjustment costs due to loss of 
control over input design. But adding fixed effects does not address all sources of endogeneity of 
the proposed proxies for λ.  Causality could also go in the other direction.  For example, the 
decision to outsource could induce the firm to shift from secrecy to patenting in order to protect 
an innovation.
14   
In order to address this concern, we use a proxy for λ which, by construction, is 
exogenous to the firm.  This proxy is the number of patents granted yearly by the U.S. Patent 
Office that are linked to the industry in which the patents are used.  These data are obtained from 
the NBER Patent Citations Data File described in Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001).  The 
industrial sector to which a patent is assigned is usually not identical to the sector using the 
patented invention.  Hence it is necessary to convert data on the number of patents originating in 
an industry into the number of patents used by an industry. We are able to do this conversion 
using an algorithm kindly provided by Daniel Johnson as described in Johnson (2002). This 
algorithm takes the data on patents originating in the U.S. in each year and creates a count of the 
number of patents used by each of 38 manufacturing sectors (based on the ISIC classification).  
                                                 
14 For this reason, technological change might deter firms from outsourcing the production of a product or 
component for which competitors could more easily copy or steal an innovation (Williamson, 1985).   
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We then matched these 38 sectors to the 44 manufacturing sectors used in the ESEE. Table 2 
shows the contemporaneous patent counts for 1990 through 2002 assigned to each of the Spanish 
manufacturing sectors. The patent counts for the later years are significantly lower than those in 
earlier years because of the time lag between submission of a patent application and the actual 
granting of the patent.  Note that seven industries (energy machinery, non-specific-purpose 
machinery, agricultural and forestry machinery, machine-tools, special purpose machinery, 
weapons and ammunition, and domestic appliances) were assigned the same patent counts 
because the ISIC classification groups these industries together.  
For the regressions, we calculated, for each year, the average number of patents used in 
the sector over the previous three years and assigned this value to each Spanish firm based on its 
industrial sector. The three period lag is used instead of the contemporaneous value of patents for 
two reasons. First, year to year variations in patents are volatile and using information over a 
three year period smooths the data.
15 Second, given the time lag between patent application and 
patent granting, using the average of patent counts over the prior three years, rather than the 
current year plus the prior two years, enables us to include 2002 in our analysis.  The U.S. patents  
variable is clearly exogenous to the outsourcing decisions of the Spanish firm and enables us to 
estimate the causal impact of expected technological change on outsourcing.  
  Our model predicts that larger firms will be less likely to outsource and we therefore 
include the firm’s sales in the equation. We also control for a set of variables that have been the 
subject of previous research on the determinants of outsourcing. Since firms may use outsourcing 
as a way of economizing on labor costs (see Abraham and Taylor, 1996), we include the firm’s 
average labor cost defined as total annual spending (wages and benefits) on employees divided by 
total employment. Outsourcing may also be used to smooth the workload of the core workforce 
during peaks of demand (Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Holl, 2008). Hence, we add a measure of 
capacity utilization defined as the average percentage of the standard production capacity used 
                                                 
15We tried shorter and longer time horizons and our results were unchanged.   
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during the year. Another factor that can increase the propensity to outsource is the volatility in 
demand for the product (Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Holl, 2008). We proxy volatility using two 
dummy variables that indicate whether the company’s main market expanded or declined during 
the year. It has also been argued that very young firms may be less likely to outsource because 
they have not had sufficient time to learn about the quality and reliability of potential 
subcontractors (Holl, 2008) and we therefore include the age of the firm. Whether the firm 
primarily produces standardized products or custom made products could also affect the 
propensity to outsource production if custom made products involve more frequent changes in the 
production process. We add a dummy variable that equals one if the firm indicated that it 
produces standardized products that are, in most cases, the same for all buyers. Finally, we 
control for the firm’s export propensity, the value of exports divided by sales (Girma and Gorg, 
2004; Diaz-Mora, 2005; and Holl, 2008).
16 Summary statistics on all of these variables are shown 
in Appendix Table A-1. 
 
IV. Results 
  We use two dependent variables, an indicator of whether the firm is engaged in 
outsourcing production and the value of the firm’s outsourced production as a percentage of total 
costs.  Regressions using the first dependent variable are estimated with fixed effect Logit while 
random effect Tobit is used for the second dependent variable since 60 percent of the 
observations are zeroes.  Table 3 uses the proxies for expected technological change that come 
directly from the Spanish data (whether the firm engaged in R&D, registered patents or 
introduced new products) while Tables 4 and 5 use the exogenous measure of expected 
technological change based on the U.S. patent filings.   
                                                 
16 The firm’s location could also serve as a proxy for the ease with which outsourcing can be done (see 
Ono, 2007).  Our data do not provide this information, but a firm’s location is likely to be time-invariant  
and its potential effect on outsourcing is captured by the firm fixed effect in our regressions.  
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A. Expected Technological Change 
  Table 3 shows the coefficients on the technological change proxies from fixed effect 
Logit regressions and random effect Tobit regressions. Marginal effects from the Logit 
regressions are evaluated at the mean.  Marginal effects from the Tobit regressions are shown for 
the probability of outsourcing a positive amount, the expected value of the dependent variable 
conditional on outsourcing a positive amount, and the unconditional expected value of the 
dependent variable.  The coefficients in Table 3 are from regressions that include industry 
dummies, sales, and additional control variables; the coefficients on the additional variables are 
shown in Table 7, where column (2) uses the exact specification from column (2b) in Table 3.
17  
The proxies for technological change (R&D, product innovation, and patent registration) are all 
positive and significant in both the fixed effect Logits and the random effect Tobits. According to 
the Logit estimates, firms that engage in R&D are 7 percent more likely to outsource and firms 
that engage in product innovation or register patents are 5 percent more likely to outsource. We 
note that since these variables are all proxies for expected technological change and we do not 
know the true relationship between the proxies and the actual value for expected technological 
change, it is difficult to interpret the magnitudes of the coefficients. Hence, we prefer to conclude 
simply that there is a positive and significant relationship between outsourcing and these proxies. 
However, as explained in Part III, we cannot infer causation from these results because the firm’s 
decision to engage in R&D, create new products and/or register patents is endogenous.   
  Table 4 presents the results of fixed effect Logit and random effect Tobit regressions that 
use the exogenous proxy for expected technological change based on patent counts in the U.S. 
The complete regressions are shown in Appendix Table A-2.  The patent variable is positive and 
significant in all columns of Table 4.  This is strong evidence of a causal relationship between 
                                                 
17 In column (1) of Table 7 we report the estimated coefficients of a logit regression without firm fixed 
effects but with industry dummies.  
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expected technological change and the decision to outsource production as well as the extent of 
outsourcing. As explained above, we cannot interpret the magnitudes of the coefficients on 
patents in Table 4.   
  In Table 5, we show the coefficients on the patent variable from random effects Logit and 
Tobit regressions that use the specification generated from the model presented in the Appendix; 
complete regression results are in Appendix Table A-3.   Adding dynamics to the model, i.e. 
including lagged outsourcing as a regressor, requires that we address the initial conditions 
problem. We follow Wooldridge (2005) in specifying a homoskedastic normal density for the 
unobserved firm effect conditional on the exogenous variables and initial outsourcing.  We 
express the unobserved effect as a linear combination of the time averages of the exogenous 
variables, initial outsourcing and a normal error term which is then integrated out from the 
likelihood function. The results in Table 5 are virtually identical to those in Table 4; the causal 
impact of U.S. patents on the outsourcing decisions of Spanish firms remains even when we add 
dynamics to the model. 
B.  Alternative Explanations 
  The prior literature on vertical integration and outsourcing has focused on the role played 
by relationship-specific investments in a context where at least some part of the contract is non-
verifiable ex post and hence non-contractible ex ante (Gibbons, 2005; Hubbard, 2008; Acemoglu 
et.al., 2010).  Our model on the other hand, focuses on expectations of technology change and 
implicitly assumes full contractibility.  It is possible, and perhaps likely, that both approaches - -
expectations about technological change and the existence of incomplete markets - - play a role in 
explaining outsourcing.  Since we have not controlled for the specificity of investment, we are 
concerned that our estimates of the effect of technological expectations may be reflecting the 
effect of incomplete markets on outsourcing.   
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 In order to control for the effect of incomplete markets on outsourcing, we turn to the 
proxy for relationship-specific investments created by Nunn (2007). Nunn used 1997 data to 
calculate the proportion of each industry’s intermediate inputs that are sold on an organized 
exchange or reference priced in a trade publication. He defines “differentiated inputs” as inputs 
that are neither sold on an organized exchange nor reference priced in a trade publication. As in 
Nunn (2007), we use the measure of differentiated inputs  as a proxy for the extent to which an 
industry is subject to industry-specific investments. We matched Nunn’s data to the industrial 
sectors in the ESEE and re-estimated the regressions in Table 4 adding the differentiated inputs 
variable.
 18  The results, shown in Panel A of Table 6, demonstrate that the patent variable 
remains positive and significant.  Note also that the effect of the differentiated inputs variable is 
positive and significant which is consistent with the property rights theory in the case of the input 
supplier’s investments dominating the relationship.
19 The positive coefficient on the differentiated 
inputs variable rules out a role for the transactions cost theory because this theory predicts that 
vertical integration is more likely in the presence of relationship-specific investments. 
In Panel B, we delete firms that are in industries that have a large share of relationship-
specific inputs, defined as having a value above the median for the Nunn variable. In this way we 
restrict the analysis to firms in industries which have a small share of relationship-specific inputs. 
Since the property rights theory of outsourcing is based on the role of relationship-specific inputs, 
by focusing on industries where relationship-specific inputs are less important, the property rights 
theory of outsourcing would have less relevance for these industries.  In Panel B, we find that the 
patent variable remains positive and significant for these industries. In other words, our finding 
regarding a positive relationship between U.S. patent filings and production outsourcing by 
                                                 
18 We are unable to estimate fixed effects Logit regressions because the Nunn variables are only available 
for one year. 
19 The Nunn variable is positively but marginally significantly correlated with the patent measure we use 
for 1997 (i.e. the mean over 1994-1996) as well as with the mean number of patents over the 1990-2002 
time period (.268 and .243, with significance levels of 9 percent and 13 percent, respectively.)  
  19
Spanish firms holds for firms that are in industries where relationship-specific inputs are not 
important.  For these firms, the property rights theory would not be relevant, while our model of 
expected technological change still applies. Hence, we conclude that our findings on the effects of 
technological expectations on outsourcing do not reflect the effect of incomplete markets. 
C. Other Determinants of Outsourcing 
Table 7 presents the coefficients on the non-technology variables described in Section III. 
Column (2) corresponds to the specification in column (2b) of Table 3.  Column (1) shows the 
results without firm fixed effects. In columns (3) through (6), the analysis is restricted to 1990, 
1994,  1998 and 2002 because these are the only years in which data on some of the non-
technology variables were collected.  Columns (3) and (4) use identical specifications, except that 
Column (4) includes firm fixed effects. Finally, Columns (5) and (6) report the specifications 
from Columns (1) and (2) but restrict the sample to the four years in which data for all of the non-
technology variables are available. 
Unlike the proxies for expected technological change, the coefficients on the non-
technology variables in the model are not robust to the inclusion of fixed effects. When firm fixed 
effects are not included in the regressions, some of the non-technology variables are significant, 
supporting results from the prior literature. As shown in previous research (Abraham and Taylor, 
1996; Holl (2008) the volatility of demand for the product as proxied by market expansion, is 
positively correlated with the probability of outsourcing.  High average labor costs are also 
associated with outsourcing in columns (3) and (5), consistent with previous work (Abraham and 
Taylor, 1996). But we find no effect of sales which is at odds with the prediction of our model.
20 
The firm’s export propensity is positively correlated with outsourcing.  But, importantly,  none of 
these results remain significant when we add fixed effects. We conclude that findings from 
                                                 
20 Holl (2008) suggested that large firms may be more likely to outsource because they have greater 
capacity to establish and manage subcontracting relationships. If this is true, it would offset the negative 
relationship that our model predicts.  
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previous studies that rely on cross-sectional analyses may not be robust.  
V. Conclusions 
  Previous research on the relationship between technology and outsourcing has focused on 
the roles played by asset specificity, technological diffusion, and information and 
communications technology. In this paper we study the outsourcing of production and we propose 
an alternative perspective on the relationship between technological change and outsourcing. We 
present a dynamic model that shows that outsourcing becomes more beneficial to the firm when 
technology is changing rapidly. The intuition behind the model is that as the pace of innovations 
in production technology increases, the less time the firm has to amortize the sunk costs 
associated with purchasing the new technologies. This makes producing in-house with the latest 
technologies relatively more expensive than outsourcing. The model therefore provides an 
explanation for the recent increase in outsourcing that has taken place in an environment of 
increased expectations for technological change. 
  We test the predictions of the model using a panel dataset on Spanish firms for the time 
period 1990 through 2002.  This dataset is superior to those used in previous studies of 
outsourcing because it enables us to observe changes within firms over a long time period. Our 
econometric analysis controls for unobservable fixed characteristics of the firms and, most 
importantly, uses an exogenous measure of expected technological change, i.e. the number of 
patents granted by the U.S. patents office in the Spanish firm’s industrial sector. The empirical 
results support the main prediction of the model, namely, that all other things equal, outsourcing 
of production increases with expected technological change. Our use of the patent variable 
enables us to conclude that this relationship is causal; no prior study has been able to provide 
causal evidence of the impact of technological change on production outsourcing. We also show 
that our results are robust to the inclusion of a measure of relationship-specific investments and  
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furthermore that the patents variable remains significant when the analysis is restricted to 
industries with little relationship-specific investments.  This shows that our results cannot be 
explained by the transactions costs or property rights theories of the firm. Furthermore, while the 
existing literature has found evidence that non-technology variables play a role in the decision to 
outsource, we find no such evidence here when accounting for firms’ fixed effects.    
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A Model of Production Outsourcing 
 
In this Appendix we derive the model sketched in Section II. 
Let  kt p  be the cost of renting each machine if there is no technological change in period 
, t  i.e.,  1 =, − tt θ θ  and 
T
kt p  be the cost  when there is technological change, i.e.,  1 =. − + tt θ θδ  It is 
conceivable that the price of machines depends on improvements to the machines. We assume 











as often claimed (Gordon, 1990). 
Given that each machine produces  t θ  units of  , x  the total cost of producing q units of 
x in-house with the latest technology  t θ  is therefore, 
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 where  () ⋅ I  is an indicator function taking the value of one when the statement within the 
parentheses is true and zero otherwise. 
Equation (2) embeds several assumptions. First, when a new technology appears and is 
adopted by the firm, it has to pay  0 ≥ t s  dollars to use it. The sunk cost  t s  is associated with 
installing and using the machines of a given productivity for the first time.  t s  is incurred only 
once and includes training costs. For simplicity, this sunk cost does not depend on the firm's 
previous experience with in-house production. Thus, there are not dynamic gains associated with 
in-house production. 
Second, when there is no technological change and the firm produced in-house last period 
1 (= 0 ) − t y  then, as stated, the firm does not incur the sunk cost again. If, however, the firm did 
not produce in-house last period  1 (= 1 ) − t y  then it pays a fraction 0< 1 ≤ α  of the sunk cost. It is 
less costly to adopt a technology that was introduced in previous periods. Note, however, that we 
do not allow α  to depend on the time span between the current period and the period at which 
the latest technology appeared in the market. That is, the firm pays  s α  even if the current 
technology  t θ  has remained unchanged for many periods. Note also that the firm pays  s α  for 
the old technology as long as it outsourced during  1. − t  That is, even if the firm used the (old) 
technology in periods  2 − t  or earlier, but skipped using it in period  1, − t  it has to pay a fraction 
α  of the sunk cost. This assumption reflects "organizational forgetting" which occurs when the 
firm does not use a technology for a period of time (Benkard, 2000). 
When a new technology appears the firm can in principle ignore it and continue using the 
previous (old) technology. The upgrading or adoption decision depends on whether using the 
upgraded technology is less costly than using the old technology. This is determined by the size 
of the sunk cost relative to the savings of using the latest technology, 
11 −−
⎛⎞








simplify the analysis, and because this adoption decision is not the focus of the paper, we assume  
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that upgrading always dominates keeping the old technology. This assumption requires not too 

















 where  0 q  is the minimal amount of output that is profitable to produce. 
Assumption (A-3) implies that if the firm decides to produce in-house it will always do 
so using the latest technology. Equation (A-2) therefore refers to the costs of producing x in-
house using the latest technology available. A-fortiori, this assumption logically implies that 
suppliers of x in the market should always be producing with the latest technology because they 
spread the sunk cost of upgrading over a larger quantity of output. 
The other alternative to procuring x is by purchasing it in the market. The cost of 
outsourcing q units of x is 
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T
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 where 
T
t p  and  t p  are, respectively, the unit price of x in the presence and absence of 
technological change at t and v represents other factors affecting the outsourcing decision. 
Presumably, the suppliers of x are also facing more productive machines and may 
therefore lower their prices depending on the competitive environment in the market for x. Thus, 
we want to allow for the possibility of firms lowering their prices when their inputs are more 
productive. For the empirical part it is important to model other factors affecting the decision to 
outsource that are known to the firm but unobserved to the econometrician.  0 ≥ v  reflects 
adjustment costs due to loss of control over the input design, i.e., the additional cost of using a 
standardized input. This additional cost is absent when x is produced in-house because the firm 
can perfectly tailor the input to its specific needs. 
The revenues  t R  obtained from selling the final good do not depend on the way in which 
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Note that profits from in-house production are determined by technology and, because of 
the presence of sunk costs, by past outsourcing decisions, while profits from outsourcing are not. 
Because revenues are equal, differences in profits reflect differences in the costs of procuring  , x  
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t z  and  t z  are, respectively, the difference in variable cost between outsourcing and 
producing in-house when there is and there is no technological change. Note that if the suppliers 
of x in the market use the same technology as the final good producers then  t z  and 
T
t z  are the 
operating profits of these suppliers (gross of fixed costs) and these should therefore be non-
negative. The price paid to an outside supplier may be lower than its in-house marginal cost when 
the production of x is subject to increasing returns or learning effects which confer a cost 
advantage to suppliers producing (relatively) large amounts of x to serve a large market. In this 
case, all firms will outsource. The interesting case is therefore when  0 ≥ t z  and  0 ≥
T
t z  and we 
maintain this assumption. To simplify the analysis, we also assume that suppliers' margins are 
constant over time so that, for any q,  
  =, = f o r a l l .
TT
tt zzz z t    (A-7) 
 
At the beginning of period  , t  the firm observes the evolution of technology up to  , t  i.e., 
12 (, , ,) −− K tt t θ θθ  and its past actions. The firm makes its (discrete) outsourcing decision in order 
to maximize the expected discounted value of its profits. Note that the Markovian nature of 
technology implies that only  t θ  affects the future evolution of technology. However, because 
costs of in-house production depend on whether  t θ  is a new technology and on whether it was 
previously used or not  1 () − t y , the firm also needs to know  1 − t θ  and  1 − t y  in order to make a 
decision on  t y  (but nothing else). Thus, the firm decides upon  t y  based on its observation of 
11 (, , ) −− tt t y θ θ  and its expectation of future profits. 
Let  11 (, , ) −− tt t Vy θ θ  be the expected discounted value of the firm's stream of profits given 
11 (, , ) . −− tt t y θ θ  V  is defined by, 
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 where 
0 V  is the expected discounted value if the firm decides to produce in-house 
during  , t  i.e.,  =0 , t y  and 
1 V  is defined similarly when the firm decides to outsource, i.e., 
=1. t y  




11 11 =1 ( , , ) ( , , ) 0 −− −− ⇔ −≥ tt t t t t t yV y V y θθ θθ  
 
The value from in-house production (outsourcing) equals current profits 
01 () π π  plus the 
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 where 0< <1 β  is the discount factor and  t E  represents the expectation of a function 
of  1 + t θ  conditional on  t θ  and alternative values of  . t y   
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In order to evaluate the last terms in  (A-9) we note that because technology in period 
1 + t  remains at  t θ  with probability (1 ) −λ  or jumps to  + t θ δ  with probability λ  we have, 
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Given our simplifying assumptions, when a new technology appears the costs of both 
alternatives -- outsourcing and in-house production -- do not depend on  1. − t y  Thus, when there is 
technological change, the past history of in-house production does not matter. This implies, 
(, , 0 ) = (, , 1 ) . ++ tt tt VV θ δθ θ δθ  
 Given the model's assumptions 
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 where G  is the distribution function of s  and 
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 P roof. Using (A-8) when  1 == + tt θ θθ  and  =1 t y  as well as (A-9) we get  
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Similarly, we have  
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The difference in the firm's value between outsourcing and in-house production when 
1 == + tt θ θθ  is therefore 
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From (A-9) and (A-5) we have 
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 (which is constant over time by 
assumption (7)).  1 + t D  must satisfy,  
  { } { } 11 1 1 1 =0 , ( 1 ) 0 , ( 1 ) ++ + + + −+ − − + − − − − + − tt t t t D s M a x s zv D M a x zv D α α βλ βλ  
This implies  1 0. + ≤ t D  As explained above we assume that  0 ≥ z  and therefore 
{ } 1 0, (1 ) = 0. + −−+ − t Max z v D βλ  Thus,   
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 we let  1 + t D  on the RHS be  1, + − t s α  and for  < ≤ sss  we let 







 We want to check that the RHS operator returns these 
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Note that  1 + t D  depends on  1 + t s  and we denote  11 =( ) . ++ tt DD s We now average  1 + t D  
over  1 + t s  using the distribution of sunk costs  . G  Abusing the notation, we obtain  
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This proves equation (A-10).   
Note that 
0 () ≤ ∫
s
Gsd s s  and therefore  (,, 1 ) (,, 0 ) 0 − ≤ VV θ θθ θ because, when there is 
no technological change, outsourcing at  1 + t  is more costly that producing in-house (there are no 
sunk costs since the firm is already using the latest technology at  ) t . 
Using (A-6), (A-10) and the equality between  (, , 0 ) + tt V θ δθ  and  (, , 1 ) , + tt V θ δθ  the 
gains from outsourcing 
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These equations completely determine the firm's outsourcing decision in period t as a 
function of the firm's sunk cost at t and ( ) 11 ,, −− tt t y θθ  and other factors ( ,, ) .
T zz v  In every 
period, the firm draws a sunk cost from the distribution G  and decides whether to outsource or 
not according to (A-11). It is important to have heterogeneity in  t s  (or in  ) v . Otherwise, all firms 
of a given size q would be either outsourcing or producing in-house which is in general contrary 
to the facts. 
The first row in (A-11) indicate that when there is technological change the decision to 
outsource does not depend on  1 − t y . This is a result of our assumption on the lack of dynamic  
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gains from previous in-house experience. Thus, the probability of outsourcing at t conditional on 
a technological jump is, 
  ( ) 1 ( =1| = , , , ) = (1 ) ( )) − +≥ + + −
TT
tt t t Py z zv Ps z v Bs θθ δ β λ α  (A-12) 
  () =1 (1 ) ( ) −+ + −
T Gz v Bs βλ α  
 
It can be easily shown that  
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Gs s Bs β
λβ λ
 
where  g  is the density function of  . s  
When technological change occurs, the probability of outsourcing increases with λ  and 
decreases with  . + zv  Thus, firms facing higher expectations of technological change in their 
inputs are more likely to outsource, while larger firms (larger  ) q  and firms facing higher per unit 
cost of outsourcing are less likely to outsource. 
Note that when there is no technological change,  1 =, − tt θ θ  and the firm did not 
outsource in the previous period,  1 =0 , − t y  the gains from outsourcing are always non-positive. 
Because marginal cost of in-house production is lower than  t p  and the firm already paid the sunk 
cost (since it was producing in-house last period with the latest technology which did not change) 
it will continue producing in-house in period  . t  That is, 
 
  11 ( =1| =0 , = , , , )=0 −−
T
tt t t Py y z zv θθ  (A-13) 
 
In other words, the model implies that in-house producers will only outsource when there 
is technological change. 
When the firm outsourced in period  1, − t  and there is no technological change, it may 
decide to produce in-house in period t if the realized sunk cost  t s  is low enough. Thus, the 
probability of outsourcing is less than one (even if the technology does not change). From (A-11) 
we can easily compute, 
 




tt t t t
zv
Py y z zv Ps Bs θθ β λ
α
 (A-14) 
  =1 (1 ) ( )







As in the previous case, the probability of outsourcing conditional on () 11 ,, −− tt t y θθ  
increases with λ  and decreases with  . + zv  
Thus, when λ  increases and new production technologies are more likely to appear in 
the future, firms will be more reluctant to buy the current machines today and produce in-house 
because these technologies will soon be obsolete. Upgrading the technology -- which is the  
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optimal thing to do -- involves incurring a sunk cost di novo. The higher is  , λ  the more 
frequently the new machines arrive and the less time the firm has to amortize the sunk costs. 
Instead, the firm can use outsourcing to obtain x from supplying firms using the latest 
technology and avoid the sunk costs. All other things equal, an increase in λ  decreases the cost 
of outsourcing relative to that of in-house production making the firm more likely to decide to 
outsource. The main prediction of the model that we take to the data is that the probability of 






Mean Std Dev N All If >0
Field
Food, beverages 0.210 0.407 3461 0.020 0.100
Tobacco products 0.580 0.497 69 0.034 0.068
Textile 0.433 0.496 1099 0.048 0.110
Wearing apparel 0.536 0.499 1394 0.102 0.190
Leather articles 0.391 0.488 744 0.064 0.163
Wood products 0.279 0.449 603 0.035 0.127
Paper 0.339 0.474 638 0.038 0.115
Publishing, printing 0.582 0.493 1136 0.095 0.165
Petroleum products, nuclear fuel 0.444 0.527 9 0.081 0.216
Basic chemical 0.252 0.435 326 0.017 0.069
Paints, varnishes 0.175 0.381 228 0.007 0.041
Pharmaceuticals 0.592 0.492 557 0.044 0.076
Soaps, detergents, toilet preparation 0.484 0.501 250 0.035 0.075
Other chemicals 0.400 0.492 125 0.019 0.048
Man-made fibers 0.077 0.277 13 0.001 0.013
Rubber and plastics products 0.477 0.500 1066 0.046 0.098
Non-metallic mineral products 0.266 0.442 1610 0.027 0.103
Basic metals 0.302 0.460 665 0.026 0.089
Fabricated metal products 0.477 0.500 1798 0.059 0.125
Energy machinery 0.479 0.501 213 0.048 0.105
Non-specific purpose machinery 0.715 0.452 281 0.100 0.144
Agricultural and forestry machinery 0.775 0.420 89 0.176 0.237
Machine-tools 0.712 0.455 104 0.118 0.169
Special purpose machinery 0.592 0.492 397 0.100 0.177
Weapons and ammunition 0.740 0.443 50 0.125 0.170
Domestic appliances 0.622 0.486 196 0.143 0.235
Office machinery and computers 0.421 0.497 76 0.035 0.085
Electric motors, generators, transformers 0.615 0.489 109 0.053 0.090
Electric distribution, control, wire 0.622 0.486 267 0.063 0.098
Accumulators, battery 0.646 0.481 79 0.140 0.220
Lighting equipment 0.547 0.499 179 0.071 0.135
Other electrical equipment 0.727 0.447 176 0.071 0.101
Electronic components 0.400 0.491 165 0.023 0.058
Signal transmission, telecommunication 0.770 0.422 122 0.084 0.114
TV & radio receivers, audiovisual electronics 0.570 0.498 86 0.100 0.182
Medical equipment 0.533 0.503 60 0.033 0.066
Measuring instruments 0.719 0.451 139 0.108 0.152
Industrial process control equipment 0.375 0.518 8 0.007 0.018
Optical instruments 0.690 0.467 58 0.120 0.176
Motor vehicles 0.539 0.499 951 0.072 0.140
Other transport equipment 0.647 0.479 467 0.108 0.171
Furniture 0.374 0.484 1077 0.050 0.135
Other manufacturing industries 0.530 0.500 560 0.052 0.100
Year
1990 0.348 0.476 2045 0.047 0.138
1991 0.466 0.499 1879 0.049 0.116
1992 0.438 0.496 1797 0.054 0.127
1993 0.418 0.493 1698 0.052 0.130
1994 0.405 0.491 1683 0.049 0.122
1995 0.414 0.493 1519 0.051 0.125
1996 0.425 0.494 1539 0.055 0.132
1997 0.441 0.497 1741 0.059 0.135
1998 0.461 0.499 1608 0.061 0.132
1999 0.423 0.494 1594 0.060 0.144
2000 0.440 0.497 1719 0.057 0.130
2001 0.429 0.495 1580 0.056 0.133
2002 0.422 0.494 1567 0.054 0.128
All Firms 0.425 0.494 21700 0.054 0.130
Table 1
Value of Outsourcing by Field (1990-2002)
Incidence of Outsourcing Value of Outsourcing ÷ Total Costs 
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1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
Field
Food, beverages 1,678 1,779 1,864 1,864 1,830 1,938 1,967 2,094 2,332 2,232 2,458 2,299 2,335 1,779 643 47 29,139
Tobacco products 172 183 180 178 173 161 145 179 201 206 214 216 196 126 37 2 2,569
Textile 825 950 966 967 897 957 951 1,064 1,161 1,149 1,245 1,166 1,087 781 323 15 14,504
Wearing apparel 337 362 395 417 399 355 409 417 473 488 538 536 529 421 216 7 6,299
Leather articles 262 276 275 234 235 214 293 293 328 330 383 349 337 249 98 1 4,157
Wood products 346 377 381 396 374 363 387 406 443 444 490 484 468 344 109 5 5,817
Paper 918 1,049 1,072 1,113 1,121 1,145 1,176 1,295 1,436 1,383 1,609 1,440 1,356 985 335 13 17,446
Publishing, printing 1,143 1,297 1,408 1,474 1,480 1,665 1,671 1,910 2,107 2,277 2,479 2,375 2,154 1,695 528 19 25,682
Petroleum products, nuclear fuel 653 652 620 642 670 604 695 660 619 436 135 7 6,393
Basic chemical 2,863 3,194 3,438 3,525 3,430 3,445 3,349 3,387 4,112 3,426 3,863 3,440 3,431 2,573 922 49 48,447
Paints, varnishes 392 441 477 495 478 488 495 495 588 531 595 520 492 357 123 5 6,972
Pharmaceuticals 2,356 2,543 2,736 2,819 2,722 3,125 3,267 3,896 5,276 3,396 4,158 3,694 3,593 2,677 1,124 82 47,464
Soaps, detergents, toilet preparation 391 461 450 438 442 443 506 564 697 668 725 645 695 533 226 28 7,912
Other chemicals 959 1,051 1,105 1,152 1,143 1,159 1,140 1,187 1,385 1,211 1,362 1,260 1,234 945 353 22 16,668
Man-made fibers 257 284 307 286 282 268 278 298 343 332 369 327 331 236 91 2 4,291
Rubber and plastics products 2,710 3,164 3,316 3,308 3,324 3,304 3,400 3,561 4,096 3,832 4,268 3,833 3,590 2,496 729 24 48,955
Non-metallic mineral products 967 1,069 1,088 1,091 1,112 1,042 1,051 1,094 1,235 1,180 1,369 1,198 1,198 851 250 7 15,802
Basic metals 954 1,084 1,037 1,055 1,024 1,027 1,043 1,052 1,105 1,106 1,176 1,174 1,119 914 297 7 15,174
Fabricated metal products 1,834 1,996 2,096 2,107 2,095 2,103 2,178 2,279 2,531 2,543 2,883 2,760 2,709 2,103 655 24 32,896
Energy machinery 12,403 13,649 14,561 15,040 15,436 15,982 16,217 18,278 20,595 22,171 25,546 24,505 22,241 16,819 6,471 243 260,157
Non-specific purpose machinery 12,403 13,649 14,561 15,040 15,436 15,982 16,217 18,278 20,595 22,171 25,546 24,505 22,241 16,819 6,471 243 260,157
Agricultural and forestry machinery 12,403 13,649 14,561 15,040 15,436 15,982 16,217 18,278 20,595 22,171 25,546 24,505 22,241 16,819 6,471 243 260,157
Machine-tools 12,403 13,649 14,561 15,040 15,436 15,982 16,217 18,278 20,595 22,171 25,546 24,505 22,241 16,819 6,471 243 260,157
Special purpose machinery 12,403 13,649 14,561 15,040 15,436 15,982 16,217 18,278 20,595 22,171 25,546 24,505 22,241 16,819 6,471 243 260,157
Weapons and ammunition 12,403 13,649 14,561 15,040 15,436 15,982 16,217 18,278 20,595 22,171 25,546 24,505 22,241 16,819 6,471 243 260,157
Domestic appliances 12,403 13,649 14,561 15,040 15,436 15,982 16,217 18,278 20,595 22,171 25,546 24,505 22,241 16,819 6,471 243 260,157
Office machinery and computers 3,868 4,569 5,037 5,517 5,862 6,495 7,013 8,924 11,600 13,382 16,419 15,714 11,554 6,177 2,391 102 124,624
Electric motors, generators, transformers 261 299 326 323 338 335 331 364 407 424 493 474 476 364 124 5 5,344
Electric distribution, control, wire 261 299 326 323 338 335 331 364 407 424 493 474 476 364 124 5 5,344
Accumulators, battery 261 299 326 323 338 335 331 364 407 424 493 474 476 364 124 5 5,344
Lighting equipment 261 299 326 323 338 335 331 364 407 424 493 474 476 364 124 5 5,344
Other electrical equipment 261 299 326 323 338 335 331 364 407 424 493 474 476 364 124 5 5,344
Electronic components 1,662 2,005 2,221 2,409 2,721 2,887 2,919 3,555 4,311 4,681 5,766 5,847 5,789 4,435 1,968 99 53,275
Signal transmission, telecommunication 996 1,163 1,321 1,355 1,466 1,576 1,706 2,195 2,745 3,275 3,969 3,677 2,614 1,454 530 23 30,065
TV & radio receivers, audiovisual electronics 1,548 1,803 1,940 2,010 2,130 2,152 2,259 2,857 3,272 3,562 4,153 3,434 2,600 1,492 502 26 35,740
Measuring instruments 2,471 2,736 2,972 3,013 3,053 3,122 3,178 3,711 4,130 4,360 5,004 4,775 4,510 3,145 1,016 37 51,233
Optical instruments 138 164 180 182 177 171 179 207 236 251 288 266 274 215 72 6 3,006
Motor vehicles 4,734 5,074 5,396 5,632 5,342 5,288 5,485 5,806 6,545 6,903 7,633 7,502 7,491 6,727 2,427 83 88,068
Other transport equipment 1,150 1,219 1,323 1,328 1,322 1,268 1,321 1,340 1,482 1,518 1,719 1,809 1,679 1,420 561 21 20,480
Furniture 1,998 2,180 2,320 2,474 2,424 2,486 2,658 2,916 3,115 3,271 3,656 3,495 3,381 2,702 950 36 40,062
Total 126,055 139,511 148,858 153,734 157,453 162,848 166,218 187,390 214,155 225,858 260,773 248,800 225,432 167,821 63,528 2,525 2,650,959
Year
Table 2
U.S. Patent Counts Assigned to Spanish Field of Use 
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Table 3 
Technological Change and Outsourcing, 1990-2002
a 
Using Data from Spanish Survey as Proxy for Technological Change 
A. Dependent Variable is Incidence of Outsourcing (Fixed Effect Logit Regressions) 
  (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
  Coeff Mfx Coeff Mfx 
R&D Activities  0.4424***  0.0971*** 0.3354*** 0.0725*** 
  (0.0829) (0.0187) (0.0780) (0.0166) 
Product  Innovation  0.2715*** 0.0594*** 0.2259*** 0.0486*** 
  (0.0645 (0.0146) (0.0619) (0.0134) 
Patent Registration  0.1982*  0.0430*  0.2187**  0.0463** 
  (0.1065) (0.0226) (0.1028) (0.0211) 
Year Dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes 
N  11062 11062 12267 12267 
 
B. Dependent Variable is Value of Outsourcing/Total Costs (Random Effect Tobit Regressions) 
  (3a) (3b) (3c) (3d) (4a) (4b) (4c) (4d) 
   Marginal  Effects  Marginal  Effects 







R&D Activities  0.0312***  0.0582*** 0.0101*** 0.0132*** 0.0316*** 0.0590*** 0.0102*** 0.0134*** 
  (0.0040) (0.0076) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0041) (0.0076) (0.0013) (0.0018) 
Product  Innovation  0.0160*** 0.0297*** 0.0052*** 0.0067*** 0.0145*** 0.0270*** 0.0047*** 0.0061*** 
  (0.0035) (0.0065) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0035) (0.0066) (0.0011) (0.0015) 
Patent  Registration  0.0138** 0.0258** 0.0045** 0.0059**  0.0155*** 0.0290*** 0.0050*** 0.0066*** 
  (0.0056) (0.0105) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0056) (0.0105) (0.0019) (0.0025) 
Year  Dummies  No No No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  18981 18981 18981 18981 18981 18981 18981 18981 
          
 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
a Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The full regression for column (2b) appears in column (2) of Table 7. All regressions include sales, percent 
capacity utilization, average wage, and dummy variables for firm’s main product market expanding or declining. If year dummies are not included, the age 
of the firm is added to the regression. 
b Marginal effects for the probability of being uncensored 
c Marginal effects for the expected value of the dependent variable conditional on being uncensored 




Technological Change and Outsourcing, 1990-2002
a 
Using U.S. Patents as Proxy for Technological Change 
A. Dependent Variable is Incidence of Outsourcing (Fixed Effect Logit Regressions) 
  (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
  Coeff Mfx Coeff Mfx 
log (Patents)  0.6816***  0.1618***  0.7173*  0.1481** 
  (0.1713) (0.0415) (0.3625) (0.0677) 
Year Dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes 




B. Dependent Variable is Value of Outsourcing/Total Costs (Random Effect Tobit Regressions) 
  (3a) (3b) (3c) (3d) (4a) (4b)  (4c)  (4d) 
    Marginal Effects    Marginal Effects 
  Coeff p(0,1)
b E(y|y>0)
c E(y*)




log  (Patents)  0.0095*** 0.0175*** 0.0030***  0.0040***  0.0072*** 0.0133***  0.0023***  0.0030*** 
  (0.0023) (0.0043) (0.0007)  (0.0010)  (0.0024) (0.0044)  (0.0008)  (0.0010) 
Year Dummies  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  18917 18917 18917  18917  18921 18921  18921  18921 







*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
a Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Complete regression results are in Appendix Table A-2. All regressions include sales, percent capacity 
utilization, average wage, and dummy variables for firm’s main product market expanding or declining. If year dummies are not included, the age of the 
firm is added to the regression. 
b Marginal effects for the probability of being uncensored 
c Marginal effects for the expected value of the dependent variable conditional on being uncensored 
d Marginal effects for the unconditional expected value of the dependent variable  
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Table 5 
Technological Change and Outsourcing, 1990-2002
a 
Dynamic Models Using U.S. Patents as Proxy for Technological Change 
A. Dependent Variable is Incidence of Outsourcing  
  (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
  Coeff Mfx Coeff Mfx 
log  (Patents)  0.0244*** 0.0058*** 0.0271*** 0.0064*** 
  (0.0092) (0.0022) (0.0093) (0.0022) 
lag of Outsourcing  2.0098***  0.4548***  2.0676***  0.4648*** 
  (0.0578) (0.0118) (0.0588) (0.0119) 
Outsourcing in year 1  1.7211***  0.4010***  1.7211***  0.4001*** 
  (0.0999) (0.0212) (0.1001) (0.0212) 
Year Dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes 
N  17575 17575 17575 17575 
      
 
B. Dependent Variable is Value of Outsourcing/Total Costs  
  (3a) (3b) (3c)  (3d)  (4a)  (4b) (4c) (4d) 
    Marginal Effects                 Marginal Effects 
  Coeff p(0,1)
b E(y|y>0)
c E(y*)




log  (Patents)  .0019***  0.0047*** 0.0006***  0.0008***  0.0018***  0.0045*** 0.0007*** 0.0009*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0005)  (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
lag of Outsourcing/Costs  0.4802***  1.1692***  0.1515*** 0.1957***  0.4787***  1.1660***  0.1509***  0.1949*** 
  (0.0129) (0.0338) (0.0041)  (0.0055)  (0.0130)  (0.0339) (0.0041) (0.0055) 
Initial Outsourcing/Costs  0.3888***  0.9467*** 0.1227***  0.1585*** 0.3871*** 0.9430***  0.1221*** 0.1576*** 
  (0.0204) (0.0502) (0.0065)  (0.0086)  (0.0208)  (0.0512) (0.0067) (0.0088) 
Year Dummies  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  16743 16743 16743  16743  16743  16743 16743 16743 
             
 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
a Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Complete regression results are in Appendix Table A-3. All regressions include the mean values of sales, percent 
capacity utilization, average labor cost, and product market expansion or decline. If year dummies are not included, the age of the firm is added to the 
regression. 
b Marginal effects for the probability of being uncensored 
c Marginal effects for the expected value of the dependent variable conditional on being uncensored 





Technological change & Outsourcing, 1990-2002 
The Effects of Relationship-Specific Inputs on the Incidence of Outsourcing
a
Random Effects Logit Regressions 
            
A. Including All Industries             
           
   (1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b)     
   Coeff.  Mfx  Coef.  Mfx     
log (patents)  0.2382***  0.0537***  0.1764***  0.0393***     
   (0.0582)  (0.0131)  (0.0585)  (0.0130)     
Relationship-specific inputs       4.2505***  0.9463***     
       (0.3267)  (0.0741)     
            
              
N 19399  19399  18664  18664     
            
B. Restricted to Firms in Industries with Below-Median Relationship-Specific Inputs    
            
          
   (3a)  (3b)         
   Coef.  Mfx         
log (patents)  0.2556***  0.0465***         
   (0.0848)  (0.0155)         
N 13381  13381         
           
 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01             
           
   
            
a Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  All regressions include year dummies, sales, percent capacity utilization, average 
wage, and dummy variables for firm’s main product market expanding or declining. Relationship-specific investments are the 
percentage of the value of inputs that are neither reference priced nor sold on an organized exchange from Nunn (2007).  
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Table 7 
Marginal Effects from Complete Logit Regressions, 1990-2002, and Restricted to 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002
a 
  1990-2002 
 
1990, 1994, 1998 and 2002 
   (1)   (2)    (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
R&D Activities  0.1328*** 0.0725***   0.1109*** 0.0878***  0.1311***  0.0870*** 
   (0.0166)  (0.0166)    (0.0185) (0.0327)  (0.0182)  (0.0314) 
Product Innovation  0.1310***  0.0486***    0.0849*** 0.0635**  0.1009***  0.0629** 
   (0.0145)  (0.0134)    (0.0182) (0.0270)  (0.0178)  (0.0257) 
Patent Registration  0.0840***  0.0463**    0.0843*** -0.0131  0.0885***  -0.0077 
   (0.0227)  (0.0211)    (0.0265) (0.0458)  (0.0265)  (0.0433) 
Market Expanded  0.0561***  0.0078    0.0578***  0.0314 0.0645*** 0.0304 
   (0.0125)  (0.0124)    (0.0159) (0.0237)  (0.0159)  (0.0225) 
Market Declined  0.0167  0.0146    0.0289 0.0319 0.0320* 0.0271 
   (0.0132)  (0.0135)    (0.0188) (0.0282)  (0.0187)  (0.0267) 
% Capacity Usage  0.0005  -0.0001    0.0006 0.0004  0.0004  0.0004 
   (0.0004)  (0.0004)    (0.0005) (0.0008)  (0.0005)  (0.0008) 
Avg Labor Cost  0.0001  -0.0001    0.0034*** -0.0007  0.0037***  -0.0007 
   (0.0001)  (0.0002)    (0.0008) (0.0014)  (0.0008)  (0.0014) 
Age of Firm  0.0013***      0.0008**   0.0009**  
   (0.0004)      (0.0004)   (0.0004)   
Sales 0.0646  -0.0756    0.0105  -0.1497 0.0241 -0.1509 
(000000000 of Euros)  (0.0514)  (0.0849)    (0.0321) (0.1818)  (0.0344)  (0.1756) 
 
Digital machine tools     
 
0.0275* 0.0207     
         (0.0157) (0.0266)     
Robotics       0.0316 -0.0185     
         (0.0197) (0.0337)     
Firm normally 
changes products     
 
0.0946*** -0.0056     
         (0.0178) (0.0284)     
Standard Product        -0.0188 -0.0614     
         (0.0183) (0.0392)     
Exports/sales       0.0776** 0.1353     
         (0.0362) (0.0921)     
Firm fixed effects  No  Yes    No  Yes No Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes    Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  No    Yes No  Yes  No 
N 19433  12267    6573 2311  6573  2311 




* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01         
a Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  Robust standard errors clustered by firm are used in columns (1),  (3) and 
(5). All regressions include year dummies. Variables are defined in the text and summary statistics are shown in 










Appendix Table A-1 
Summary Statistics  
    
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev. 
      
Engaged in R&D activities 0.3748  0.4841 
Firm normally changes product  0.2375  0.4256 
Engaged in product innovation   0.2475  0.4316 
Registered patents   0.0838  0.2771 
Product is standardized   0.6292  0.4830 
Market expanded  0.3396  0.4736 
Market declined   0.1909  0.3931 
Uses computer digital machine tools   0.4056  0.4910 
Uses robotics  0.2181  0.4130 
Average labor cost per employee 
(thousands of Euros)  25.960  12.222 
Export value divided by sales  0.1640  0.2456 
Age of firm  23.9305  22.536 
Capacity utilization rate 81.8359  15.2313 








Appendix Table A-2 
Complete Regression Results for Corresponding Columns in Table 4
a 
Dependent Variable: Incidence of Outsourcing in (2a)- (2b) and Value of Outsourcing/Total Costs in (4a)-(4d) 
          
  (2a)  (2b) (4a) (4b) (4c)  (4d) 
          
          
log of patents  0.7173**  0.1481**  0.0072***  0.0133***  0.0023***  0.0030*** 
  (0.3625)  (0.0677) (0.0024) (0.0044) (0.0008)  (0.0010) 
Market expanded   0.0464  0.0095  0.0144***  0.0266***  0.0047***  0.0061*** 
  (0.0597)  (0.0122) (0.0033) (0.0061) (0.0011)  (0.0014) 
Market declined   0.0692  0.0142  0.0050  0.0093  0.0016  0.0021 
  (0.0664)  (0.0133) (0.0037) (0.0069) (0.0012)  (0.0016) 
% capacity usage  0.0008  0.0002  0.0004***  0.0006***  0.0001***  0.0001*** 
  (0.0021)  (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Average labor cost  -0.0002  -0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
  (0.0009)  (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Total Sales  -0.3031  -0.0626  0.0223**  0.0412**  0.0072**  0.0093** 
(000000000  of  Euros)  (0.3927)  (0.0813) (0.0092) (0.0171) (0.0030)  (0.0039) 
 
YearDummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
 
N  11078  11078 18921 18921 18921  18921 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 





Appendix Table A-3 
Complete Regression Results for Corresponding Columns in Table 5
a 
Dependent Variable: Incidence of Outsourcing in (2a)- (2b) and Value of Outsourcing/Total Costs in (4a)-(4d) 
          
  (2a)  (2b)  (4a) (4b) (4c) (4d) 
 Coeff.  Mfx  Coeff.  Mfx  Coeff 
Mfx 
 
log  of  patents  0.0271***  0.0064***  0.0018*** 0.0045*** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 
  (0.0093)  (0.0022)  (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
If outsourced in t-1  2.0676***  0.4648***  0.4787***  1.1660***  0.1509***  0.1949*** 
  (0.0588)  (0.0119)  (0.0130) (0.0339) (0.0041) (0.0055) 
If outsourced in initial period  1.7211*** 0.4001*** 0.3871***  0.9430*** 0.1221*** 0.1576*** 
  (0.1001)  (0.0212)  (0.0208) (0.0512) (0.0067) (0.0088) 
Market Expand (mean)  0.7435***  0.1753***  0.0493***  0.1202***  0.0156***  0.0201*** 
  (0.1667)  (0.0393)  (0.0090) (0.0219) (0.0028) (0.0037) 
Market Decline (mean)  0.5084***  0.1199***  0.0288***  0.0700***  0.0091***  0.0117*** 
  (0.1901)  (0.0448)  (0.0105) (0.0257) (0.0033) (0.0043) 
% Capacity Usage (mean)  0.0150***  0.0035***  0.0011***  0.0027***  0.0003***  0.0004*** 
  (0.0037)  (0.0009)  (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Average labor cost (mean)  0.0028  0.0007  0.0003***  0.0007***  0.0001***  0.0001*** 
  (0.0018)  (0.0004)  (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Sales  (mean)  0.3098*  0.0730* 0.0133 0.0324 0.0042 0.0054 
(000000000  of  Euros)  (0.1717)  (0.0405)  (0.0090) (0.0218) (0.0028) (0.0036) 
 
YearDummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
N  17575  17575  16743 16743 16743 16743 
          
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01             
a Std. errors in parentheses             
 